Introduction
Transportation planning, perhaps more than other areas of planning practice, suffers from a split identity. On the one hand it is an area in which engineering considerations frequently dominate, and many of its practitioners are in fact professional transportation engineers. On the other hand, it is a particularly politicized arena in which planners work, at least on the local level; virtually no planning issue can rally a neighborhood to political action as readily as a proposed freeway bisecting it. Even less controversial questions such as changes in bus service regularly elicit heated debate.
The clash of the political environment and the engineering mode of operation makes transportation planning a particularly interesting laboratory for an investigation into the uses of information in planning and the responses of planners to ambiguities in their practice. In particular, the input of citizen participation into the transportation planning process may shed light on some of these issues. Mandated by law and espoused by numerous scholars and practitioners, 2 citizen participation in transportation planning may be seen by the planners themselves as a "bizarre imposition from the outside b J fuzzy minded, misguided forces [that can] only lead to bad planning."
If some transportation planners and engineers have been unrecep tive to citizen input, it may be due to the clarity with which they see their mandate; they optimize safety, capacity, and cost, 4 and citizen input can only blur their criteria for evaluation. That citizen input is desirable in order to determine the priorities of communities need not be argued here. More interesting is the question of what impact citi zen participation has on planning and decision-making and how such input might be made more effective.
Citizen input is insufficient to ensure citizen influence; as Arnstein noted, there are many potential uses and abuses of citizen input apart from true participation in decision-making. 5 Though there can be no guarantee of effective influence, the kind of information citizens bring to bear, the processes by which they present their views, and the de gree to which they are able to understand the planners' mode of think ing will all affect their influence over the process. In this paper I will examine a planning episode in which citizens attempted to influence the outcome, but have thus far failed. Their failure may provide insights into developing more fruitful methods of input in the future. It is important to note that this paper does not focus on how the planner might elicit citizen input, but on how the citizen might influence transportation decision-making, and how the planner might respond to citizen input.
The Tunnel Road Controversy
The episode in question in fact generated remarkable levels of citi zen input. Berkeley's Tunnel Road serves as a link in the major corri dor from communities south and east of Berkeley into the downtown and the campus area, as well as to Interstate 80 northbound (Figure 1) . Though it is a residential street, it is a part of the state highway system (Route 13) and collects traffic from the freeway portion of Route 13 as well as Berkeley-bound traffic from Highway 24.
Traffic on the road is heavy, and though the asphalt is striped for single-lane use only, its width on the inbound side allows the formation of two lanes of traffic along much of the road's length, something that drivers do regularly. The two-lane operation of the road is purely ad hoc; its width is not sufficient for two official lanes of operation. As a part of the state highway system, Tunnel Road is operated by the California Department of T ransportation, or CaiT rans; the state agency would bear responsibility for any design changes.
The area adjoining Tunnel Road is well-to-do, and its politically active residents object to the heavy volume of traffic flowing through their neighborhood. Among the many controversies surrounding the road's operation is the question of whether it should continue to be used as an ad hoc two-lane facility or should be redesigned to allow one-lane use only. The latter option is favored by the residents for safety and aesthetics; CaiTrans favors the status quo, chiefly to main tain the road's capacity. The City of Berkeley has no official position, and residents have petitioned both the City and CaiTrans for improve ment of the situation.
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The Use of Information
An assumption pervading much of the literature on citizen participa tion is that professionals respond best to professionally communicated information. Commenting on a common pitfall of citizen input, Bleiker writes: "Solutions proposed by laymen are not completely worked out, are put forward rather late in the process and often in the midst of controversy, and are generally communicated in such a manner that they are rejected out of hand by the professionals."
6 Manheim advo cates closing this information gap by providing studY. information to citizens on procedures used in transportation planning. 7
The presumption that planners respond best to a professional level of communication may well be true. But regardless of the nature of the communication, the processes by which it was developed and presented may determine its fate. Due to active citizens' groups and an involved Transportation Commission, the Tunnel Road controversy generated a large amount of citizen-planner communication. The vari ation in the sophistication, quantification, and professionalism of this information and its presentation allow an examination into a range of attempts to influence a planning process. Following is a sam,pling of types of citizen-produced information and planners' responses.
Anecdotal Information
The majority of neighborhood residents are neither planners nor engineers; the information that they feel most comfortable in presenting --indeed the information that may be the most meaningful to them --is personal stories and rich anecdotes. What occurs when these stories are heard by transportation planners is another matter.
For example, in 1985 a neighborhood resident wrote to the district director of CaiTrans: "Recently I walked with my children to their schools along Tunnel Road ... The experience left me so shaken that I now constantly fear for the safety of my children ... They walk home after school every afternoon and Tunnel Road is the only route they can take. You might recall the accident last spring of a truck losing its brakes, hitting the sidewalk and overturning along precisely this stretch of Tunnel Road. I travel Tunnel Road almost daily and know that it's a dangerqus street to drive on but it is ten times more dangerous for pedestrians. There have been many other less publicized accidents and near accidents. I witnessed one the day I accompanied my chil dren to school. A car trying to pass another to the right scraped his tires on the curb and bounced back into traffic ... [O)ne short stretch along Tunnel Road has no sidewalk forcing pedestrians into traffic with cars speeding by at 40 miles per hour. "9
In a similar vein, another neighborhood resident enclosed a clipping on the above-mentioned accident to the Berkeley City Manager, adding: "Had last Friday's accident happened at the time when chil dren from the Bentley school walk down the road, this could have been a fatal one ... Tunnel Road has been rightly called by a Berkeley journalist 'the narrowest unofficial highway in the world.' Needless to say, this is the most dangerous road to drive through in Berkeley." 1 0 Such anecdotal information proved little to the CaiTrans personnel. The response to the first letter read, in part: " .. .In regard to your other concerns, the accident rate on Tunnel Road is below the statewide average expected for this type of facility and changes to the roadway geometries cannot be warranted on the basis of traffic safety. Further, reducing the roadway width to provide for one-lane operation in each direction would cause back-ups of 300 to 500 vehicles northbound in the A.M. peak hours. Since the back-up would start at the beginning of the one-lane restriction the back-up would extend well onto the high speed portion of Route 13. This would create serious safety and liability problems." 11
Whether statistical information on the roadway's safety would have carried greater weight with the CaiTrans personnel can only be answered speculatively; at the very least theCaiTrans planners would have had to rebut it. But most likely a statistically based argument would have centered on the question of what is "this type of facility." The citizens would likely assert that Tunnel Road should be compared to other residential streets, while the planners would view it as merely one of a class of two-lane state highways running through urban areas, 12 though the road's status as neither a one-lane nor a two-lane facility would certainly hamper comparison with other roads.
Quasi-Technical Information
Perhaps aware of the relative weakness of their position due to lack of technical information, the citizens may at times try to quantify their information for presentation to the planners. The results are some times humorous, but illustrate an important phenomenon; lay people feel a need to counter the technical information generated and deman ded by the planners.
An example of this came not from Tunnel Road but from neighbor ing Ashby Avenue, another segment of State Route 13. The neighbors, lacking any objective measure of accident rates along their stretch of Ashby, did what planners do: they conducted a survey. By polling the participants at the organization meeting, they arrived at statistics on observed accidents, presented in the following manner to the Berkeley Transportation Commission: Another attempt at dealing with the planners' appetite for quantifi able data was made in 1980 by a Tunnel Road resident who attempted to counter the planners' expertise with professionalism of her own: "As a Statistician, I periodically make counts of the traffic passing 34 Tunnel Road. Since the opening of the new Highway 24, the traffic coming west on Tunnel Road has decreased slightly but the traffic going east has increased markedly." 1 4 Neither of these letters received a response, and there is little reason to suspect that transportation engineers or planners would have found them more convincing than information of the first type.
Professional Communication
A more organized and relevant attempt to utilize professional cre dentials came several years later. In 1985 the residents concluded that the most productive approach to the CaiTrans engineers would be through the presentation of concrete improvement proposals, and a member of their association who happened to be a practicing civil engineer prepared a detailed proposed plan for the road including side walks, parking bays, median dividers, and provisions for a single lane of traffic. 1 5 The plan was Ptresented to City staff, one of whom lauded it as a "craftsman-like job." 6
The plan was never adopted as city policy. Instead, the city staff acted in the capacity of a "mail carrier" in presenting the plan to the CaiTrans engineers. "You tell us what you want, we'll pass it on" was the attitude of City staff, according to the plan's developer. 1 7
The plan was rejected by CaiTrans, as had been the previous propo sals. The agency issued a plan of its own that restated its original concept for the road. 1 8 The plan included, incidentally, accident statis tics indicating that for the city portion of Route 13 as a whole (includ ing Ashby Avenue as well as Tunnel Road), accidents were double the statewide average for roads of that type, 1 9 though the accident rate for Tunnel Road specifically is in fact slightly lower than average. 20
Reasons for Failure: Lessons from Planning Theory
The process described above is a failure not because the citizens did not get what they wanted; there is no way of showing that their concerns need necessarily take precedence over those of Call rans, the drivers, or the residents along alternate routes to which the drivers might be diverted through capacity restrictions. Rather, the failure is found in the utter lack of movement by either of the sides towards the other or even an acknowledgment of the other side's terms of refer ence. To the neighbors Tunnel Road is a neighborhood street, while to CaiTrans it remains a legislatively mandated state highway.
No common assumptions were developed; no shared approaches on how even to measure the problem were defined. The responsibility for this failure is shared by both the citizens and the planners involved. But perhaps more important to the ultimate "failure" referred to above, the agenda was framed so that the proposals were mutually exclusive, rather than in a fashion that would encourage the develop ment of compromise proposals. That tone continues through the pres ent day, with the one-lane and two-lane proposals being debated as though a unique determination needed to be reached between them.
Fra ming of the Question
In fact, they may be compatible; two lanes or left-turning lanes may be provided in the vicinity of intersections, thus minimizing the reduction in traffic capacity.
22 Given the present polarized debate, this solution is unlikely to be reached, however. In a fashion similar to that described by Bleiker/ 3 the opponents framed their debate in either/or terms, rather than in a more compromise-oriented style.
Modes of Interaction
In addition to a rigid framing of the issues, the mode of interaction adopted by the citizens was not conducive to any compromise solu tions. Relations betwee n the citizens and Call rans personnel were maintained strictly at a written correspondence level, and face-to-face contact in small groUf!S or even public hearings did not occur, at least for the past five years.
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25 The citizens' reliance on city personnel must be predicated either on an assumption that the city will adopt their plan as its own and will utilize its technical and political resources in presenting the plan to CaiTrans, or alternatively on the assumption that the plan will be adopted on its merits independent of any city backing. In fact, the former assumption was the citizens' original hope; when that was proven wrong they chose to rely on the latter.
A more productive strategy might have been to bypass the City after the City's limited role became apparent, and to rely instead on face-to face communication with the CaiTrans personnel. Such an approach might have allowed the development of mutual understandings that could have formed the basis for the citizens' drafting of the plans for Tunnel Road. The citizen's plan as an accomplished fact apparently stood little chance of generating agreement despite its profes sional preparation.
Addressing Other Sides ' Concerns
A major task for both parties to such a face-to-face meeting is answering the concerns of the other side. On the surface, certain con cerns in the Tunnel Road controversy were addressed by the parties involved.
The citizens' concern about safety, for example, was answered through the use of accident statistics. The citizens may be forgiven if the response did not put their anxieties to rest; for them, CaiTrans' statistics miss the point. Whether or not the road is less safe than average, they feel unsafe when they use it. The tangibility (to them) of the road's danger is a prime factor in the intensity and the lifespan of the controversy. The fact that they may be unable to articu late that sense of danger which is unanswerable by any statistic or the inappropriateness of the statistical measure itself has left them helpless in the face of the evidence.
If the CaiTrans planners did not adequately answer the residents' safety · worries, the residents probably did an even poorer job of addressing the planners' concerns. Their communication represented a progressively more refined version of their proposals, but never con fronted the capacity issue, which was the planners' primary concern. There are a number of arguments the citizens might have raised, but, given the static and stilted process of communication with the agency, the citizens may not even have been fully aware of the planners' con cerns. The citizens might legitimately have claimed, for example, that capacity is primarily determined by number of lanes at intersections, as described above. They might have argued that, given the sizeable backups already existing, the extra impact of slightly diminished capacity would be barely felt. They might even have suggested that reduced capacity is desirable, either to encourage diversion of traffic to Telegraph Avenue (a wider commercial street), or to encourage transit use. These arguments were not unknown to the residents; in the words of the civil engineer who drafted the citizens' plan, "I could have made a case, but was never given a forum." In fact the forum of citizen CaiTrans meetings was always available but was unutilized. Agency personnel were thus not unjustified in feeling that the citizens had not attempted to answer their concerns: "The homeowners never addres sed the question of backups." 26
Engineering Thinking Applied to an Urban Issue
In the current case, the planners are engineers; this fact brings out even more clearly the weaknesses of "rationalist"-style planning. The attempt to optimize certain values (in this case road capacity) under a system that is not designed to take immeasurables into account led to community alienation from the results of the process.
Moreover, disagreement remains on precisely what it is that the CaiTrans engineers are maximizing. On the one hand, one CaiTrans engineer stated: "We're concerned with safety, capacity and cost, with a strong emphasis on the safety."
27 The drafter of the citizens' plan had a different view of the agency's values: "The CaiTrans guys are really pretty open [to citizen input]", he states, "but capaci� is unbroachable. They will talk about anything but reducing capacity."
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Institutional and Political Factors
The privilege and wealth of the Tunnel Road citizenry hardly places it in a class of communities requiring concerted efforts at empower ment. It nevertheless has meager means to force a bureaucracy into action. Apart from the large but unorganized driving population, CaiTrans has no direct constituents, and in a case where the agency desires the maintenance of the status quo, there is no effective process to force review. Banfield 29 showed how veto groups may exist for vir tually any change; far fewer groups have the ability to prod an agency into action.
The citizens attempted to enlist the City's political support; such backing never came, possibly due to concerns about capacity restric tions on traffic levels in other Berkeley neighborhoods.
Further attempts at political backing were made through an appeal from Assemblyman Tom Bates. 30 These too proved an ineffective substitute for mechanisms to guarantee responsiveness to citizens among bureaucratic organizations. It may be that if CaiTrans is to continue to operate highways that are viewed locally as neighborhood streets, an organizational structure based on subregional units or even locally elected directorates would be more responsive than the current struc ture. Alternatively, CaiTrans might choose to return such streets to local control, something it has actually been trying to do in the case of Tunnel Road but has been hampered in doing by a number of political issues, including the one described in this paper.
An especially interesting element of the Tunnel Road controversy is the conscious use of ambiguity; by allowing Tunnel Road to remain as an ad hoc two-lane facility, CaiTrans has decided not to decide. Striping for two-lane operation would be unacceptable from a design standpoint, while restricting the flow to a single lane is apparently untenable politically. The way out of the dilemma from the standpoint of the agency is apparently maintenance of an ambiguous status quo. The use of ambiguity to avoid difficult decisions in the legal sphere has been well-documented; it may be that ambiguous solutions to hard planning questions demand similar investigation.
Conclusion
The importance of both face-to-face communications and respon sive government structures is emphasized by their absence in the Tunnel Road controversy. The issue did not lack for citizen participa tion, nor for citizen-generated information. However, such information, when presented unprofessionally, is unfortunately dismissed as irrele vant. But, as the experience with the citizens' professionally prepared plan shows, professional-level communication can also be futile when no shared understandings of the planning issues and values involved have been developed through face-to-face communication. But infor mation and communication, though necessary, may still be insufficient when the planning agency has not developed mechanisms to ensure responsiveness to the variety of claims it faces. 
